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I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE
In 1972, the Deputy Comptroller for Audit Operations (Directorate for
Interservice Audits) of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis) conducted an audit of the air-to-air missile support
requirements of the Navy and Air Force. In part, the audit disclosed that
"Better management of and control over the missiles possessed by the two
Services is needed." (DoD Audit, 1973, p. 2).
This disclosure was reinforced by responses to the following questions:
How accurate is the Navy inventory accounting system for air-launched
missiles? Is it accurate to within one percent, three percent, five
percent?
When this question was asked of air-launched missile weapon systems
managers, the response was unanimous; no one knew. The managers only
knew it was yery inaccurate, and that it did little to assist the manager
in his planning function. (Ledbetter, Wilson, 1976). The most predominate
criticism was the failure to account for material
,
i.e., a lack of inven-
tory control
.
For inventory and weapon system managers, correct answers to these
types of questions are essential to good decision making. In the military
services, an inventory manager is responsible for an equitable distribu-
tion of assets to accommodate various strategic needs. For obvious eco-
nomic reasons, the quantity of assets he has to work with is limited.
Therefore, within the constraints of the available assets, he must be
able to both distribute, and at times, redistribute these assets to meet
routine and special demands.

The importance of special management for high-value items has long
been recognized. However, until recently, accounting control of high-
value assets has not been alloted the attention required to effectively
manage expensive inventories. (Brock, 1964, p. ii). Extremely expensive,
complex and sophisticated inventory management systems have been less than
impressive, and much less than satisfactory, because of the lack of asset
knowledge used as an input. Valid asset data is an absolute prerequisite
for the success of any inventory management system for high-value material.
(Brock, 1964, p. 2).
It is a well-known fact that one of the most complicated systems in
the military is the inventory system. One cannot exaggerate the importance
of an inventory to a military operation since the readiness of any fight-
ing unit depends in a large part on the availability of the basic weapon,
spare parts and other support items. (Schrady, 1972, p. 339).
It is apparent then that development of sophisticated, automated systems
to provide asset accountability is useful, but only if they provide the
type data needed and in the accuracy needed.
The objective of this thesis is to develop a technique to assess the
worth of inventory accounting systems.

II. SCOPE, IMPORTANCE OF STUDY, AND METHODOLOGY
A. SCOPE
Inventory studies generally focus on aspects of economic order quantities,
forecasting, lost sales, etc. (Buffa, 1969, pp. 503-534, Schrady, 1972 ,
pp. 339-383). This thesis, however, will concern itself with the account-
ability aspects of inventory systems. It will primarially be concerned
with systems used to control and record the distribution of air-launched
missiles for the U. S. Navy and Air Force. It will attempt to develop
needed techniques and make preliminary tests of them. It will not attempt
to carry out full scale tests, but will make recommendations for needed
continuation and testing.
B. IMPORTANCE OF STUDY
Inventory reports of the major components of air-launched missiles
need to be more accurate for use in current inventory management
and future inventory planning. We found differences between missile
inventory balances reported under the formal inventory control system
and those reported under a special monthly inventory report. . . .
Our review disclosed that neither inventory report was sufficiently
accurate for management's use. (DoD Audit, 1973, p. 3).
As an example of problems caused by imbalance, consider the following
hypothetical cases: Let the U. S. Navy have fifteen thousand air-to-air
missiles in its inventory. Also, let the price per unit average $25,000.
Then, the value of the inventory is 15,000 x 25,000 or $375,000,000, exclud-
ing spare parts and special support equipment. Now, let the accuracy of
the inventory count vary by plus or minus ten percent. The value now
varies between $337,500, 000 and $412,500, 000, or a difference of $75,000,000,
The example illustrates the high waste resulting from inaccurate inven-
tory count. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that if one believes that

the inventory figures are in error, one will tend to overbuy rather than
take the chance of not having enough assets in case of an emergency.
The air-launched missile inventory is of extremely high value. One
need only to peruse the Fiscal Year 1977 Authorized Budget to determine
this. (U. S. Senate, 1976, pp. 42-43). It follows then, that if the
U. S. Navy is going to spend millions of dollars on air-launched missiles,
it should be willing to spend some percentage of that amount to develop
a system to accurately keep track of those high-dollar value items.
In private business, it is normally desirable to maintain an inventory
posture as small as possible while still being capable to meet demands.
This is necessary to keep the number of dollars invested in unneeded assets
at a minimum. The same logic applies to inventory quantities in the mili-
tary. In either enviornment, there is one basic necessity that must be
met in order to minimize the inventory quantity. That basic need is for
the inventory manager to be adequately informed as to the quantity, condi-
tion, and location of assets under his control .
C. METHODOLOGY
The following methodology was pursued:
(1) Development of an instrument to be used in assessing inventory
systems. This is found in Chapter III.
(2) Description of three systems to be assessed; the systems used by
the Navy, Air Force, and a private firm, Matson Navigation Company. This
is found in Chapters IV, V and VI, and Appendixes 3, C and D.
(3) Assessment and rating of the three systems. Chapter VII and
Appendix E perform this function.
(4) Recommendations for improvements for the Navy system to allow it
to meet Navy Managers needs based upon the application of the instrument

developed. In addition, recommendations for further testing and possible
uses of the instrument will be made. The recommendations are found in
Chapter VIII.
D. DEFINITION OF TERMS USED
In both military and private sector operations, persons tend to develop
special language tools which simplify their communication needs. These
tools appear commonly as acronyms, abbreviations, and especially coined
expressions to describe a particular process. In this thesis, the authors
will use the "terms of the trade" in their natural role. The normal words
of the trade will be used to facilitate the reading process. For some
persons reading this thesis who may be unfamiliar with some of the terms,
a glossary of terms used is included as Appendix A.
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III. ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE INVENTORY ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
As in any other accounting system, an inventory accounting system must
have certain fundamental attributes to work effectively. These attributes
are highlighted to provide a basis for judging the relative merits of var-
ious "in-use" systems and to provide a springboard for suggesting a system
for future Navy use. For purposes of this thesis, the inventory systems
evaluated will be perpetual systems rather than periodic.
Before discussing the attributes essential for an effective system,
one should consider the fundamental intent of any inventory accounting
system.
Regardless of the commodity being managed, the essential questions to
be answered are nearly always the same. The questions are:
How many are there?
Where are they?
Which ones are where?
What is their condition?
How well an inventory accounting system answers these four questions
determines the quality of the system.
Many of these attributes will be seen to relate to more than one of the
questions. Although the attributes are not considered to be all inclusive,
they are considered by the authors to contain the most important elements.
Each attribute will be discussed individually and examples given where it
is deemed appropriate for clarity.
A. SIMPLICITY
This element was listed first because it is so often ignored when
accounting systems are assembled, especially in applications where computers
11

are involved. Systems should be designed to answer the questions asked,
and not designed to answer every question that might be asked. While
additional types of data may be "nice to have," unless they are clearly
required, they tend to (1) overburden the manager with extraneous data and
(2) create potential areas where errors or misinterpretations can occur.
Systems which are "generalized" to meet the needs of many persons generally
meet the real needs of no one. (Alexander, 1975, p. 99). The user of the
system's output should be able to visualize the source of the derived data
while the person entering the data should have an understanding and apprecia-
tion of how his input is used. This latter understanding is necessary to
develop the desire to provide accurate input data.
Inventory accounting systems should be capable of standing alone rather
than being part of a total management information system. This is not to
say that the same computer cannot be used, nor some of the inputs would not
be the same. What is meant is that the inventory accounting system would
be capable of accepting input information, processing the data, and provid-
ing answers to the four basic inventory questions, regardless of the action
of the other aspects of a general management information system.
B. ACCESSIBILITY
While systems need the element of simplicity, they also must be easily
accessible. Accessibility refers to both inputs and outputs. In consider-
ing that inputs may come from many sources, one must realize that the input
function may be radically different depending on the authority of the
agency entering the data. For instance, a gatekeeper may be authorized
to update the system by recording the serial number of an item that appears
at the gate, but he may not be authorized to correct an error in the system
12

made previously. On the other hand, the item manager may be authorized to
correct errors, override existing data and input virtually any type of
information into the system.
Output information from an accounting system may be channeled to many
sources. Often the output reports are of a limited distribution. The idea
is to provide the information for each data user that is helpful to him--
no more, no less. The essential element is to have the right information
available at the right time .
C. TIMELINESS
Knowing what your checking account balance was one year ago does little
good unless you have made no deposits or withdrawals. The same applies to
an inventory accounting system. While knowing the quantity on hand, loca-
tion, and condition one year ago may be adequate on some slow-moving assets,
items which are subject to dynamic usage variations require much more cur-
rent data. Timeliness, therefore, is a function of the potential dynamics
of a particular product.
While it might be feasible to develop an inventory accounting system
that could give virtual real time status on the number of golf courses in
a small town, it would be an extreme waste of resources. In this example,
the number of courses is small and the quantity virtually fixed. The
answer would almost always come back as "no cnange," or at best, a change
of "one." Therefore, the degree of timeliness must be a subjective judge-
ment made by the user of the data.
D. ACCURACY
The accuracy of any accounting system must be a function of several
variables. Ease of accounting is one variable that usually comes to mind.
13

Banks can be expected to maintain a close accounting of assets because
the item they are dealing with has an obvious common denominator.
Another important variable to be considered is the basic need for
accuracy. Industry has led the way in working with approximate quantities.
For example, it is common practice to estimate the number of low-cost items
in a container rather than perform an absolute count. Often an item manager
will be able to make perfectly rational decisions based on approximate inven-
tory quantities.
In some cases, the value of the item will play an important role in
determining the needed accuracy. While an absolute count of the pocket
calculators owned by the Navy may be ridiculous, the exact number of PHOENIX
missiles would be a different matter.
Often there are items that are given special inventory accounting atten-
tion because of their critical ity. One-hundred-thousand-dollar missiles
have been held up from production delivery for the want of a sixty-cent
capacitor. When shortages such as this occur, the critical components are
often given special accounting attention, at least until the shortage is
overcome. Although the item is cheap and would normally not warrant an
accurate accounting, a count is sometimes essential. Each capacitor loca-
ted by the contractor can mean a one-hundred-thousand-dollar sale.
E. COST EFFECTIVENESS
While all of the previously mentioned attributes are important, the
element of cost weaves its way through each. For any inventory accounting
system to be worthwhile, it must be worth its implementation and operational
costs. It would be unreasonable to expect to spend more to track an inven-
tory than to purchase it. The question then is "how much should be spent
to track an inventory?" The answer must be viewed as a trade-off analysis.
14

The trade-off evolves from the need for additional or excess inventories
which are necessitated by having limited knowledge of the exact inventory
size. For instance, if an inventory of one thousand items is needed, but
the accuracy of the physical count may vary as much as ten percent, an
overbuy of ten percent may be necessary. Thus, procurement costs are ten
percent above the minimum requirement.
One should look very carefully at the need for timeliness, accessibility,
and accuracy and compare the costs involved in gaining these attributes
with the costs of compensating the inventory size. As an extreme example,
one would not expect to spend much money to maintain a close track on items
worth, in total, less than one thousand dollars. Certainly it would be
foolish to spend a thousand dollars. But, in a more practical sense, one
might be expected to spend several hundred thousand dollars to maintain a
close surveillance of an inventory of items valued at several billion
dollars.
F. CONFIDENCE
The concept of confidence should connote a degree of reliability of the
system. While the system may be 100 percent accurate, one must be confi-
dent that is the case. If that confidence is not held, an accurate inven-
tory quantity is meaningless to the manager. Conversely, if the manager's
confidence is misplaced and the inventory system is truely unreliable, he
may end up counting on assets that are nonexistent. Either situation is
unacceptable. Therefore, it can be said that the usuable inventory account-
ability system must be reliably accurate.
G. RECONCILLIATION
An inventory accounting system, as with any other accounting system,
may, at times, be in error. In recognition that a recorded count can vary
15

from the actual physical count, some form of reconcill iation is essential.
Even if there are no errors, there are occasions when accounts need to be
verified. No better way exists to verify an account than to actually
count the quantity of items in stock. Perpetual inventory systems, while
still needing a periodic physical count, have a unique advantage over
purely periodic inventory systems. The advantage is that the count does
not necessarily have to be made simultaniously. (Moonitz, Strehling, 1952,
p. 251). In reconciling a perpetual inventory, the concern is with vari-
ances in physical versus recorded quantities at various locations. While
the counts need not be made in a "stop-action" mode, if time lapses exist
between the counts, intermediate transactions must be taken into account.
An optimized system would be one that has a built in error-correcting
feature. At least a system must be mechanized so that when a physical dis-
crepency is discovered, it is immediately corrected.
H. INPUT CONFIRMATION
The term confirmation, as used in this thesis, is often referred to as
feedback. Persons providing inputs to a system need an acknowledgement
that their input has been received correctly and understood. The confir-
mation can be as simple as immediate restatement by the receiver of the
input, or can be in the form of a final output report. The function of
confirmation should be prompt, simple and dependable.
16

IV. THE U. S. NAVY AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The Navy Ammunition Management System is called CAIMS (Conventional
Ammunition Integrated Management System). The intent of CAIMS is to
establish a single point of reference within the Navy for information
relative to the worldwide status of Navy expendable, non-nuclear ordnance.
Included are requirements, assets, production, expenditures, costs, and
technical inventory management data regardless of inventory management or
ownership responsibilities. (OPNAVINST 8000.13, 1971). CAIMS was designed
to eliminate multiple reporting systems, provide CNO (Chief of Naval Opera-
tions) one real time computerized data base to make operational decisions
and to reduce the reporting burden on the Fleet.
A. CAIMS NETWORK
The CAIMS Network is shown in Figure 1. CAIMS is programmed on a
UNIVAC 494 digital computer located at SPCC (Ships Parts Control Center),
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.
B. INPUTS
Basically, CAIMS can receive inputs from anyone of 10 primary stock
points (Naval Ammunition Depots and Naval Weapon Stations), 25 secondary
stock points (Naval Air Stations, Naval Ordnance Stations and Marine Corps
Air Stations), 26 Minor CONUS (Continental United States) activities hold-
ing ammunition primarily for internal consumption or testing, and approx-
imately 500 Fleet and overseas activities.
The 10 primary stock points report to SPCC by TIR/SLIT (Transaction
Item Report/Serial Lot Item Tracking) via AUT0DIN (Automatic Digital Net-
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and Accounting Procedures/Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue
Procedures) on a daily basis. The 25 secondary stock points report to
SPCC by TIR only, again by AUTODIN, also on a daily basis, and again in
accordance with MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP procedures. The minor CONUS activities
report a summary position of their assets or expenditures on a quarterly
basis by U. S. Mail. All Fleet ships and overseas bases report to SPCC
by message TIR on an as-occuring basis, i.e., any receipt, issue, adjust-
ment, expenditure or reclassification is reported on the day it occurs.
If no action occurs, there is no negative report. (SPCCINST, P--8010.12B,
1975).
C. OUTPUTS
CAIMS data is output to many different users by different means and
in different forms. CINCLANTFLT/CINCPACFLT (Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
Fleet/Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet), CNO, CENO (Central NOMIS Office),
and Inventory Managers at SPCC, NAVAIRSYSCOM (Naval Air Systems Command),
NAYSEASYSCOM (Naval Sea Systems Command), and NMEF (Naval Mine Engineering
Facility) all receive on-line, real time output via the WU37 remote covered
(crypto) terminal. Currently, there are 13 WU37 terminals in existence
(none located at weapon stations).
Other activities obtain CAIMS data by mail in the form of SISRs (Selec-
ted Item Status Report) and/or Asset and Experience Data and also by mailed
magnetic tape. TYCOMs (Type Commander) must rely on the mail system, and
ships must rely on the TYCOMs for feedback.
D. ALM FUNCTIONAL FLOW (GENERAL)
ALMs (Air Launched Missile) are acquired as sections from vendors under
contract to NAVAIR. An AUR (All -Up Round) is assembled from four to five
different major sections. Sections are procured from both commercial and
19

military manufacturing activities, and are positioned by the acquisition
manager at NAVAIR at a WPNSTA (Weapons Station) or a commercial contractor
for assembly. (SAI, 1975, pp. 1-2 to 1-5). Upon receipt by a WPNSTA, the
quantity and NSN (National Stock Number) of the sections are introduced
into Navy Inventory by electronic TIR to the CAIMS data base at SPCC. Each
serialized section is also introduced separately into CAIMS by a supple-
mentary SLIT report keyed to the TIR quantity report by the TIR document
number.
Upon assembly of sections to an AUR, an NSN is assigned to reflect an
AUR and the individual sections are expended from inventory by TIR/SLIT
reports. TIR reporting continues through the life span of the AUR occuring
upon issue, receipt and change of condition, e.g., serviceable (A)/unser-
viceable (F), etc. SLIT reporting includes all the above actions, but is
limited to WPNSTA reporting only. There is no serialized reporting when
the AUR/ALM component is in transit, in the custody of the Fleet, INAS
(Industrialized Naval Air Stations), or NAVAIREWORKFACS (Naval Air Rework
Facilities).
Following malfunction or failure of prescribed tests, AURs and ALM
sections are normally retrograded to the nearest IMA (Intermediate level
Maintenance Activity) which is either MMMU-1 (Mobile Missile Maintenance
Unit-1), Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, or one of the three continental
WPNSTAs.
The IMA tests and disassembles the AUR and performs intermediate level
maintenance on the individual sections. Should repair of a section be
beyond IMA capability, the section is shipped to a depot level maintenance
activity. The exceptions to the above are noted below:
(1) An unserviceable section transferred from MMMU-1 is usually reas-
sembled into an AUR for ease of handling and economy of containerization.
20

The AUR is shipped to one of the WPNSTAs in CONUS where it is disassembled,
inspected and retested, if necessary, before a final decision is made to
ship it to a depot.
(2) Some operational NASs (Naval Air Station) and MCASs (Marine Corps
Air Station) within CONUS perform the IMA function relative to disassembly
and remating and request disposition instructions from NAVAIR on disposi-
tion of the defective units. Periodically, NAVAIR issues instructions to
ship the defective units directly to an INAS for NAVAIREWORKFAC rework.
During the retrograde process, TIR reporting is continued. Upon receipt
of an AUR or component section, the WPNSTA begins SLIT reporting again.
When an AUR is disassembled, the AUR is deleted from the inventory and
each component is reported into CAIMS as an added inventory asset by serial
number. TIR and SLIT issue reports are made anytime a GCG (Guidance and
Control Group) is transferred to a depot. When the INAS receives the GCG,
only a TIR report is made to CAIMS, i.e., NSN quantity only, no serial
numbers. Next, another TIR is made to change the condition code of the
unit when the unit is inducted into the NAVAIREWORKFAC.
When a GCG has been reworked and tested satisfactorily by the NAVAIRE-
WORKFAC, another TIR is made by the INAS to report the unit in serviceable
(A) condition, and the unit is held in storage until the INAS receives
issue directions from NAVAIR. It is important to note that no inventory
reporting is made by the NARF when the unit is under repair. Any section,
however, that has been determined by the NARF to be beyond economical re-
pair is surveyed from Navy assets and reported as expenditures by INAS.
This removes the quantities from CAIMS only by NSN.
The inventory manager directs the INAS to issue serviceable GCGs
normally to WPNSTAs where they are once again assembled into AURs. Upon
shipment to the WPNSTA, a TIR is made to CAIMS and receipt by the WPNSTA
21

is both TIR and SLIT reported. Upon AUR assembly, the individual sections
are expended from the inventory to the AUR, and the AUR is reported as new
inventory, thus beginning the cycle again.
A Functional Flow diagram is shown in Appendix B.
E. DOCUMENTATION
There are three general catagories of documentation associated with the
movement of AURs and component sections. They are "transfer and receipt"
forms, "production and maintenance" forms and automated system output
documents.
Transfer and Receipt--DD Form 1348-1, "Department of Defense (DoD)
Single Line Item Release/Receipt Document" (NAYSUP 437) is used for move-
ment between DoD activities as the base accountability document. The
DD Form 1348-1 is also used for ALM hardware movement within the WPNSTA.
In addition to the DD 1348-1, 12ND NWSC 8015/16, "Receipt/Expenditure
Transfer—Miscellaneous Ammunition (Work Sheet)," and, in some cases,
Form 1149 are also used. For movement from a commercial contractor to a
DoD activity, a DD Form 250 serves the same purpose.
A general receipt card (Alameda), or a component induction card
(Norfolk) which are both machine generated by the UADPS/SP (Uniform Auto-
mated Data Processing System for Stock Points), are used within the INAS/
NARF to move ALM hardware from the INAS Supply Department storage to the
NARF depot level maintenance shop. The completed section is transferred
from the NARF to INAS Supply Storage on a general return card (Alameda) or
a component receipt card (Norfolk). Accountability is maintained through
shop order cards while the unit is under repair in the NARF. These cards
are generated by the NARF workload control system.
Production and Maintenance Documents—The BOM (Bill of Materials)
specifies work to be performed and estimated material requirements, and
22

is prepared by the PP&C of the WPNSTA. NAVORD Forms 4790/5(7A) "Shore
Activity Maintenance Data Collection System" (MDCS) are used to collect
maintenance data and NAVORD Forms 4790/5(7B) are used to collect configura-
tion data. Both the BOM and MDCS documents, in addition to either the
DD 1348-1 or the DD 250, are used as source data for the daily update of
the NOMIS (Naval Ordnance Management Information System) by the AD&C
(Ammunition Distribution and Control Division) at the WPNSTA. Indirection
cards, stow cards, and transfer and receipt documents serve the same pur-
pose for the UADPS/SP at the INAS.
Automated Systems Output--Transaction cards for AUTODIN transmission
to SPCC are generated by both the NOMIS and the UADPS/SP at the WPNSTA and
INAS, respectively for the daily update of CAIMS. Although both systems
provide TIR cards, only NOMIS has provisions for serial number control and
the capability of providing SLIT cards. Hard copy printouts are generated
on a periodic basis from the CAIMS data base. This information is available
to the IM via WU37 remote terminal.
23

V. THE U. S. AIR FORCE AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. SYSTEM MAKEUP
The USAF Ammunition Management System provides strategic data for the
control and management of reportable (selected) ammunition items, air
interceptor missiles and air-to-ground missiles (AIM and AGM). The com-
puterized system referred to as the DO-23 is comprised of four subsystems:
(1) the Ammunition Asset Reporting System (D0-23A), (2) the Ammunition
Requirements Computation System (D0-23B), (3) the Ammunition Lot Number
Reporting System (D0-23C) and (4) the Ammunition Transportation Reporting
System (D023E). This thesis will focus on the function of the D0-23A
system only.
B. FUNCTIONS OF THE D0-23A
The D0-23A, located at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, provides the computer-
ized heart of the Air Force's ammunition accounting system. Ogden Air
Logistics Center acts as the office of primary responsibility for the AFLC
(Air Force Logistics Command). Input data from throughout the world are
processed by the DO-23A's IBM 7080 computer. Input data reports from more
than 250 locations throughout the world are compiled to provide periodic
status of the distribution and condition of selected ammunition items.
There are 41 total products which include reports, control files and error
lists. There are eleven routine reports published by the Ogden Air Logis-
tics Center at Hill AFB. These reports are:
Monthly Consumption List
Reportable Item Master File by DODIC
Reportable Item Master File by NSN
Missile Asset Listing




USAF Ammunition Summary Report
USAF World Wide Ammunition Asset Report
Reportable Item Master File by Manager Designator
Master Location File by SRAN
Master Location File by Base Name
In light of the intentions of this thesis, only the World Wide Asset
Report will be of concern. This report contains the basic detail from
which the item manager can determine actions required for tactical redis-
tribution. The listing indicates quantities, condition (serviceable/un-
serviceable) and location of all reportable items. In addition, the items
reported in transit by a reporting activity appear as "due- in" items for
the activity which is to receive them.
C. REPORTABLE ITEMS
Only certain items need be reported to the D0-23A system. These items
are on an output listing (card outputs) of the Headquarters ALC (Air Logjs-
tics Command) DO- 71 System. The card outputs provide the basis for estab-
lishing base and command reportable item files. Item managers from either
Ogden or Warner Robins AFLC must have previously registered the item with
the DO-71 system for it to appear on the Headquarters AFLC SNUD (Stock
Number User Directory). The system also identifies all item types stored
in remote accounts. Each month a revised SNUD is published to potential
reporting activities. Major commands are required to "achieve and maintain
an Air Force acceptable reporting error rate of less than one percent."
(AFM 67-1, 1975, p. 20-12).
D. REPORTING
Status reports on all reportable items are required to update the D0-23A





The reports provide the basic data which, when processed by the
D0-23A system, allow the inventory managers to:
a. Provide a data base to prepare higher level directed reports.
b. Provide inventory and transaction visibility to the IM for
redistribution actions, requirements computations, and deter-
mination of readiness posture for actual or planned operations.
(Four major commands use their DO-78 systems for comparable
management purposes).
c. Expedite distribution/redistribution or replacement of stocks
when required due to suspension action.
d. Program surveillance testing to provide reliability data.
e. Predict the effect of anticipated losses through aging.
f. Determine and affect replacement and disposal programs.
g. Rotate stocks of items of limited service/shelf life to obtain
maximum use.
h. Notify activities concerned of any suspect or dangerous lots.
(AFM 67-1, 1975, p. 20-65).
2. Who Reports
All activities in possession of reportable assets are required to
provide input data for the D0-23A system. The reporting procedures vary,
however, for different commands. Data from a satellite base will be trans-
mitted to a host base, compiled with other host and satellite data and then
transmitted to the D0-23A system in Ogden. Some major commands choose to
collect data from subordinate bases on the DO-78 and retransmit to Ogden.
A base may be a host or a satellite, and may be in a DO-78 or non-DO-78
command. In the event more than one command occupies the same base, gener-
ally the host command will be the responsible reporting agency.
One additional reporting activity is the Warner Robins Air Logistics
Center. Warner Robins provides inputs relative to the transactions of
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assets that are removed from or being added to the normal reporting stream,
i.e., missiles and components shipped to and from the Navy's rework facility
or newly procured items.
3. Report Periodicity
Bases or reporting activities prepare reports each time a trans-
action occurs that changes either the serviceable or unserviceable balance
or the peace-time operating level of a reportable item. Bases equipped
with Univac 1050 II computers schedule their systems to process reports
daily. Noncomputerized bases submit reports as directed by their major
commands. Major commands and bases reporting direct to Ogden ALC process
reports weekly. End-of-the-month reports are also required. These reports
indicate the report number of the last report previously submitted. A
sequence number is assigned to highlight missing reports and allow verifi-
cation or corrective action.
4. How Reports are Submitted
If DCS AUTODIN facilities are available, both bases and major
commands use them. Precedence for all electrical transmissions are not
lower than "priority." Input data are automatically translated to the
AUTODIN format using either a 1050 II base system or DO-78 major command
system. Satellite and remote independent bases without computer access
keypunch their data, for ease of input, into the automated systems. If
DCS AUTODIN facilities are not available, base level activities report by
telephone, message, or, at the option of their major command, by mail if
the total mailing time does not exceed three days. Regardless of the
reporting method, reporting units maintain copies of all transaction reports
for a period of one year. These reports are saved for the purpose of
affecting any reconcill iation that may be necessary. Appendix C is a flow
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chart which portrays the information flow within the Air Force Ammunition
Management system, and displays the interrelationships for reporting between
commands.
E. D0-23A PROCESSING OF INPUT DATA
Regardless of the source of input data, when the information is received
at Ogden, it is in punched-card format. The input data is screened auto-
matically by the D0-23A for obvious format errors. When input data from the
field which has been preprocessed by the base or major command systems is
in disagreement with what normal calculations the D0-23A performs, the input
data are accepted as being correct. This process is referred to as "overlay"
by the Ogden personnel. (Kopinsky, 1976). The assumption is made that the
activity holding the assets has the most likely probability of being correct.
Of course, when there are major discrepencies, the personnel at Ogden verify
the input data through direct contact with the reporting base or command.
F. THE USE OF THE DATA
The World Wide Asset Report provides the item managers with a numerical
picture of the quantities, location and condition of their system assets.
With this purview, the item manager is able to determine the possible avail-
ability of assets for redistribution and compute requirements for buying
for budgeting purposes and continued worldwide asset support. Since the
report indicates the distribution of major subassemblies (in the case of
missile assets), the item manager can, if necessary, match up the various
subassembly combinations to maximize the total round utility. This mating
and matching, however, is generally handled manually by the item manager.
G. RECONCILLIATION PROCEDURES
An annual reconciliation of asset balances between Ogden ALC and those
major commands maintaining and operating a DO-78 system, and between Ogden
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ALC and those bases or activities reporting directly to Ogden ALC is required
in November each year. Prior to conducting the base-to-command or base-to-
Ogden ALC reconcill iation, a base physical inventory is required. The Air
Force refers to this action as their annual "wall-to-wall" count. After the
reconcill iation is completed, new report sequence numbers are used, beginning
again with "one."
H. SUPPLEMENTAL SYSTEM
While the D0-23A system provides the "official" data relative to asset
distribution, supplemental information is also needed on some systems. For
instance, on the SPARROW and SIDEWINDER systems, when missile assets are
sent for rework, they are held by a "non-reporting" agency, e.g., the U. S.
Navy's rework facility. Since these assets tend to become "lost" from the
system, the item managers maintain an unofficial manual log whereby they are
able to piece together a reasonable total asset picture. (Upright, 1976).
I. SPECIAL FEATURES
A yery important item that should not be overlooked in the Air Force
inventory accounting process is the assignment of a MASO (Munition Account-
able Supply Officer). This assignment at each base or command provides an
accountable person for munition handling and reporting responsibilities.
It is the responsibility of the MASO to ascertain that all required
reports are completed and to provide whatever training necessary to insure
the proper input data are submitted at the proper time. Additionally, he
is responsible to be certain that proper storage facilities and procedures
are available for requisitioned assets. He also has the responsibility to
check the base's assets against their authorized quantities, and to take
the necessary action to rectify variances.
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VI. AN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM— MATSON NAVIGATION COMPANY
A. TYPE OF BUSINESS
The Matson Navigation Company, a subsidiary of Alexander and Baldwin,
Incorporated, is engaged in the business of freight transportation primarily
on ocean-going vessels. They are the exclusive transporters of merchandise
between the mainland west coast ports (Oakland and Los Angeles) and the
Hawaiian Islands.
B. BACKGROUND
In the late 1950s, Matson began converting to large merchandise con-
tainer-vans to facilitate loading, handling and accounting functions. Today
all of Matson 's ships, except those still transporting bulk commodities such
as sugar, have been converted to accommodate van-packaged loads. Each of
these ships can accommodate approximately 1000 container-vans.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTAINER EQUIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
In 1972, Matson installed CECS (Container Equipment Control System) for
the purpose of making container yard operations more efficient. (Burkart,
1976). CECS was designed to provide CURRENT information quickly on con-
tainers and container equipment for the port regions of Oakland and Los
Angeles. Some benefits that have been realized by CECS are: (Matson CECS
Manual, 1972).
--Better customer service through:
a. Advance knowledge of equipment availability.
b. Ability to trace container location easily.
--Better utilization of equipment to minimize capitalization.
--Avoidance of lost equipment through systematic reporting of
equipment out of yard.
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—Easily accessible information for special purposes such as
inventory reporting.
*
D. FUNCTION OF CECS
Appendix D is a functional flow diagram of the Matson CECS. As can be
seen in Appendix D, current information in the CECS is maintained through
the use of direct access remote on-line stations located at strategic work
areas throughout the container yards. The direct access stations are key-
board entry and video display stations and are "on-line" to a dedicated
partition in a computer located at the Matson Navigation Company Corporate
offices in San Francisco. The system is "on-line" approximately 20 hours
each day through full duplex private lines.
All container movement in and out of the gates or on and off ships is
recorded immediately using the remote terminals. Remote terminals are
available at each gate, in the yard towers, and at the Matson Corporate
offices in San Francisco. Receipt/release forms are printed remotely in
the gate house under computer control. In addition, at the option of yard
management, container movement within the yard or between the yard and ships
is recorded either immediately or at periodic intervals. An extremely
important feature of the CECS is that no entry is accepted by the computer
unless it is consistent with previous entries or unless the operator makes
a positive override of the computer edits.
Once an entry has been accepted by the computer, the information immed-
iately supplants previously entered data. For example, Jones Trucking Com-
pany carrying container-van with serial number 12345 arrives at the gate in
Los Angeles. The gate operator notes the serial number and enters it into
the system. The system sends a rejection message back to the operator in-
forming him that container-van 12345 is located at Smith Trucking Company
in Oakland. If the gate operator verifies that he is correct, he can then
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physically override the system and bypass the rejection message and enter
container-van number 12345 in the system as being in Los Angeles. (This
logically assumes, of course, that there are not two container-vans with
serial number 12345). The container-van in Oakland whose number is unknown
will be picked up by the inventory system as it passes an entry terminal
either at Oakland or Los Angeles, thus balancing the system again.
Hard copy of the video displays is available at all times through a
printer unit located near the remote terminals.
Although CECS controls all containers while in the yard, once a con-
tainer goes aboard a ship, it exits from the CECS control, whereas containers
leaving by truck are generally "on a string" which will continue to be held
by the CECS. For example, a container put aboard a ship bound for Hawaii
is logged out as heading west. When that container reaches Hawaii, it may
be put aboard another ship headed for Guam, but the records in the computer
show that the unit is in or on the way to Hawaii. Only when that same unit
is put aboard a ship headed for the mainland are the records updated. Since
Hawaii does not have remote entry terminals, the records are updated via
message received at the home offices. When the unit is off-loaded at the
Matson facilities at either Oakland or Los Angeles, the records are further
updated.
The above does not hold true if the unit is mounted on a trailer. Once
the unit leaves the yard by truck, for drayage purposes, Matson has track
on it at all times through the drayman.
As can be seen in Appendix D, the container number (or serial number)
is used to trace the unit. There are other ways, of course, e.g., by dray




Output from the system is in the form of reports generated on-line
by the computer both for display and hard copy. An example of the daily
output reports are listed below:
1. Summary of containers by type
2. Detail of containers by type and status
3. Equipment out of yard
4. Equipment inventory
5. Daily activity summary
An example of the hard copy output is shown in Figure 2.
The system is on-line from 0700 each morning to 0300 the following
morning seven days a week. Between 0300 and 0700 each morning, the system
is updated to reorganize files, accept new tapes, accumulate history infor-
mation and generate reports.
F. OUTSIDE APPLICATION
It is interesting to note that Matson not only tracks their own container-
vans, but also fills, ships and tracks container-vans for other companies.
All together, Matson tracks approximately 40,000 containers of various sizes
(24 feet to 40 feet in length) and capacities which perform various functions
(refrigerator containers, liquor tanks, fruit containers).
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55 cr cr \
6 4 1 1
41 31 1 9
17 1 6 1
1 1
i 1
04/20 1344 REG 2 SV<
TYPE DESCRIPTION
ROF LT LEASE RORO 40FBED
POL LT LEASE RORO 40LB0Y
100 MNC STNRD DRY CONTNR
190 MNC STD DRY CTN SIDE
200 MATSON HI CUBE 4QFT
J
250 MNC STD DRY CTN AERO
300 MNC AUTQRACNS INTERI
310 MNC AUTORACKS WC-HAW
340 AUTO_FRAME VAN 40 FT
401 MNC FLA TRACKS - OLD
405 MNC FLATRACKS - NEW
410 FLATRACKS-FE CONV
420 MNC CARBN STEEL Tr
427 5600 GAL TANK-24 FT
450 MNC BULK FEED CONTNR 36 35
455 MNC SHLITZ MALT BULK 2 2
470 MNC HALFFLATRACK4GFT 6 2 1
460 MN HI CUBE FLAT RACK 64 47 3 & g
500 MNC STD INS NQN REEF 14 12 1 1
600 MNC STD DRY VENT CTN 39 35
610 MNC STNRD DRY CONTNR i 26 1 04 4 2 16
670 MNC STD DRY OBNX CTN 1 ]
600 MNC STD REEF-4 WALL 21 14 1
610 MNC STD REEF-2 WALL 72 36 34
640 MNC SlD RFR W-DAMPER 36 1
3
4
650 MNC ME/RA REEF 4 WAL 16 16
860 MNC ME/RA REEF 2 WAL 9 6 i
670 MNC STD REEFR-TECTRL 36 23 1 12
860 MNC ME/RA REEF-TECTL 2 2
20F MISC 20 FOOT DRY 20 5 2 13
701 SOCO JET FUEL ANTI-T 2
702 GASPRO MODIFIED 1 \
703 CASTLE COOKE DUAL CO 1 i
740 SOCO SILCA GEL CATAL 5 4
745 SCHLITZ BREW CO TANK 19 16
751 GASPRO BULK RESIN 2
775 MN LEASE TANK EDIBLE 3 3
791 JOHNSON LINE 3
210 ATSF RR STD DRY SIDE 3 2 1
26 A ATSF STD DRY SIDE 119 2
260 WP RR STRD DRY CNTNR 7 7
261 DRG RR STRD DRY SIDE 11 11
263 UP RR STNRD DRY SIDE 1 1
718 CB&Q RR INSL NO-REEF 1 1
760 AT&SF RR INSL N-REEF 9 6 1
CTU 40 FT ALUMN LEASE 2 1 1
TOF TOP 40 FOOT 93 1 3 9 6 65
TOTALS 1914 1218 63
FIGURE 2 -...Typ.ical.Hard Copy Printout (Matson)
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VII. SYSTEM ASSESSMENTS AND COMPARISONS
A. SYSTEM ASSESSMENTS
In Chapter III, the important qualities of an inventory accounting
system were developed and discussed. In Chapters IV through VI, the inven-
tory accounting systems used by the II. S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, and Matson
Navigation Company respectively were described. In this Chapter, the three
systems will be subjectively assessed by evaluating their performance char-
acteristics relative to the attributes discussed in Chapter III. In order
to provide a degree of quantification to the overall assessment, each
system's performance relative to each attribute will be determined. The







Appendix E elaborates on the rating system used.
1
. Assessment of the Navy Ammunition Management System
a. Simplicity
From the viewpoint of putting data in the system and retrieving
data from the system, the Navy system is relatively simple. Operators can
prepare punched cards and/or magnetic tapes for input with relative ease.
Outputs consisting of hard copy printout via remote terminal, magnetic tapes
(for those needing data but having no remote terminal facilities), and peri-
odic reports are reasonably available.
The Navy system provides answers to three of the basic questions,
providing one has time to spend sorting through all the data spewed forth
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by the system. The question it does not answer is exactly which assets
(by serial number) are located where.
Based upon these assessments, the system is rated as fair.
b. Accessibility
The accessibility of the Navy system is poor. This stems from
the fact that only SPCC can input information directly into the system.
TIR/SLIT information is transmitted by a WPNSTA to SPCC by AUTODIN or U. S.
Mail. Consequently, there is no method or way that a WPNSTA can directly
access the system. This is not only true for WPNSTAs, but it is also true
for any other activity, including NAVAIR.
CAIMS does generate some monthly output reports to the IMs,
but usually they are based upon data at least six to eight weeks old.
(Witter, March 24, 1976). In addition, all of these reports provide the
same information only in different formats. (Leake, 1976). True, the IMs
can obtain hard copy readouts from the WU37 remote terminals, but again,
these readouts are based upon noncurrent information. Classification of
the reports and readout (SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL) also limit the distribu-
tion accessibility.
c. Timeliness
The Navy system, relative to timeliness, is suspect. The asset
picture can change daily, sometimes hourly. When inputs to a complex system,
with respect to movement or expenditure of assets, encounter delays of sev-
eral days before the changes are recorded, the system can hardly be thought
of as timely. (SAI, 1975, pp. 2-6). As a matter of fact, there have been
times when backlogs of TIR cards have been as large as 3,000. (DoD Audit
Report, 1973, p. 26). These backlogs have led NAVAIR to resort to an in-
formal system of reports, messages and telephone calls as a more current
source of inventory data. (Sullivan, 1976). In rating the attribute of
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timeliness of the Navy system, the authors feel that it can be rated no
better than poor.
d. Accuracy
The Navy found that its inventory accounting system was too
inaccurate for use in determining the total number of missiles possessed,
and felt that the formal system was too far behing "real time" to give
accurate information. (DoD Audit, 1973, p. 26). Although the CAIMS was
designed to provide NAVAIR with accurate daily CONUS inventory by means of
the WU37 terminal, the system experienced problems due to processing delays
and rejection of TIR cards. (DoD Audit, 1973, p. 26). Because of these
delays and rejections, the monthly inventory reports prepared by the IMs at
NAVAIR consistently showed adjustments as well as substantial differences
between official asset figures and data maintained by another source, i.e.,
the missile contractor. (DoD Audit, 1973, p. 25). Recent discussions with
NAVAIR program managers attest to the fact that the situation has shown
little improvement. (Wells, Van Dyke, 1976).
Based upon the above, the authors can rate the accuracy of the
Navy system no better than poor.
e. Confidence
The fact that the NAVAIR IMs chose to initiate an informal
system consisting of telephone calls, messages and informal reports as a
more current source of inventory data indicates a distinct lack of confi-
dence in the formal system. The informal system became the basis for the
Navy's inventory quantities. (DoD Audit, 1973, p. 27). Therefore, the




This attribute, relative to the Navy system, has to be rated
no better than poor, if for no other reason than the accuracy, confidence,
accessibility and timeliness are poor.
When the inventory system cannot produce a count of items that
can be believed, this then leads to overbuying of the asset, which in turn
means that taxpayer dollars are being spent needlessly. The domino effect
then takes over, i.e., more spare parts, containers, launchers, etc. have
to be purchased, not to mention more people employed to repair and test
the missile.
g. Reconciliation
The Navy system can be rated no better than poor relative to
reconciliation features. The fact that large discrepencies continue to
exist in the count justifies the above .statement. (DoD Audit, 1973, p. 27).
The Navy has no provisions for conducting a "wall-to-wall"
physical count of missile assets for the purposes of reconciliation on a
routine basis, i.e., either annually or semi-annually. In fact, the authors
have personal knowledge of only one "wall-to-wall" inventory being conducted
on one type of air-launched missile in the past four years. (Naval Missile
Center Messages, 181956Z Jan 73, 242329Z Jan 73). Though the inventory
count was taken worldwide, the records on this missile asset were never up-
dated. Therefore, the information distributed to users was no better than
before the count was taken. (Sullivan, 1976).
h. Input Confirmation
The Navy system provides no direct feedback on inputs. Feed-
back occurs only by exception, and then it is less than timely, as it
usually is fed back in the form of an error card via the U. S. Mail.
(Ferrell, 1976). As a consequence, the activity making an input never
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really knows whether or not its input data ever got into the system in a
correct and timely manner. (Meehan, 1976). Except for yery obvious errors
in quantities, errors normally will enter the system undetected.
The system, therefore, deserves a rating of not better than
poor relative to confirmation of input data.
2. Assessment of the Air Force Ammunition Management System
a. Simplicity
The Air Force Ammunition Asset Reporting Systems, while part
of a more complete inventory management system, has been made simple in
that it functions to provide the manager with an overview of his total
asset picture. While the asset reporting system is required to provide
inputs or work in conjunction with the ammunition requirements system, the
ammunition lot reporting system and the ammunition transportation reporting
system, it still provides the independent status for which it is needed.
The system also provides answers to three of the four basic questions. It
provides information related to quantity, location, and condition. It does
not, nor was it intended to, provide serialized tracking of assets.
Because the system inputs are basicaly simple, they should not
confuse the person preparing them. Examples of some of the input forms the
Air Force uses are shown in Appendix F. The output reports are in a format
that lend themselves well to manager use. Copies or examples are not in-
cluded because of their classification. With respect to simplicity, the
Air Force system is rated as good.
b. Accessibility
Inputs to the Air Force system are reasonably straight forward.
There is adequate documentation to indicate what is needed to provide inputs
and what format the inputs should follow. In addition, there appears to be
adequate pressure to cause the necessary response.
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The main problem appears to stem from the diverse location of
the accessing activities and the variations in the methods of input. With
some satellite bases reporting directly to the D0-23A and other via major
commands (and via the command's computer), the sense of communicating with
the D0-23A must at times appear to be nebulous. As the system is designed,
there is a feeling of "feeding a system," but there is also a sense of doubt
about what the system has done with the input. The accessibility of the
output is severely limited by the fact that reports to the users have a
periodicity of one month. The classification of the basic output report
(SECRET) also acts as a roadblock to accessing the computed information.
With respect to accessibility, the system can be rated no better than fair,
c. Timeliness
The D0-23A monthly output means that, at best, the system (from
the field user's standpoint) is current on the day the data are processed,
printed and delivered. Information needed during the interim period is
only available at the computer center when, and if, a special run can be
made. Inputs from the field come in by various media (including the U. S.
Mail) and at different rates. Input data which are either garbled in the
transmission or which contain obvious format errors detected by the D0-23A
edit system must be clarified and verified by a special communication be-
tween Ogden and the activity putting in the data. All such verification
activity creates delays in accurate data processing.
An additional area where the Air Force's system lacked timeli-
ness was that it took months to register a new item in the system. During
the interim, the item went unreported.
Based on the above assessment, the timeliness of the Air Force
system should receive a poor rating. However, since the monthly report
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interval was considered satisfactory by the primary. data users, the authors
rate it instead as fair.
d. Accuracy
Relative to accuracy, the Air Force system should be rated as
poor. While the data tends to be input properly by field units with a
required one percent accuracy, there are areas in the logistics flow that
are not covered by reporting agencies. For example, missile guidance assem-
blies diverted to the Navy's rework activities for repair are dropped from
the system and go unreported until the item manager at Warner Robins signals
that the units are repaired and are reissued. (Upright, 1976). Additionally,
units reported in transit tend not to be removed from that status, especially
when sent to rework, and, thus, often are counted twice. (DoD Audit Report,
1973, p. 27).
One other difficulty arises with reported items that are not
registered properly with the system. These items are not accepted by the
D0-23A and, thus, disappear from the inventory. An example is the SPARROW
AIM-7E-3 missile. Because the AIM-7E-3, which is converted from the AIM-
7E-2, is not registered properly at this time, the system has thus far re-
jected the inputs for several thousand assets. These items seem to "dis-
appear" from the inventory. Approximately one year ago, the visibility on
$12,000,000 worth of assets was lost due to an accounting quirk. (Walker,
July 13, 1976). Had the discrepency not been subsequently discovered, re-
plenishment to an overstocked status would have resulted.
e. Confidence
With respect to confidence, the Air Force system should be rated
as poor. This statement refers to the purely mechanized system. If one
considers the "total" system, which includes the informal inputs provided
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by some item managers, i.e., private logs, independent listings, and per-
sonal observations, the reliability then begins to improve, but it is still
far from optimum. (DoD Audit Report, 1973, p. 26). The air-launched mis-
sile managers tend to use the D0-23A listings to verify what they already
know. For example, the managers often take the numbers given by the D0-23A
printout as accurate as long as those numbers agree approximately with their
estimates. If there are obvious disagreements, the values which they "know"
to be correct are used. (Waller, 1976).
f. Cost Effectiveness
For a system to be considered cost effective, it must yield
information at less cost than the value the users derive from the informa-
tion. The Air Force system's performance, relative to accuracy, confidence,
timeliness, and accessibility have a direct bearing on its cost-effective-
ness rating. Without easy and timely access to quantitative data, and the
confidence that the data are correct, a manager has but one alternative;
approximation. Using approximate data, the manager cannot buy the exact
quantity necessary, but must in reality buy a percentage above that amount
that is roughly equivalent to the inaccuracy that he perceives in the in-
ventory system. Therefore, the cost-effectiveness rating of the Air Force
system should range somewhere between fair and poor. These were the ratings
given to accessibility, timeliness, accuracy and confidence, respectively.
Since, in this paper, only integer ratings are being used, the Air Force
system's cost-effectiveness rating is assessed at fair.
g. Input Confirmation
The Air Force system is assessed as poor relative to confirma-
tion. The system provides virtually no direct confirmation on input reports.
The direct feedback is provided only in the event of exceptions. If the
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data submitted creates an edit error on the D0-23A system due to format or
sequence number error, the activity entering the data can expect a direct
query. If there are other than obvious errors in the quantities, they will
go undetected. A simple confirming notice is not provided the activity
making the input.
h. Reconcill iation
Relative to the attribute of reconcill iation, the Air Force
system is assessed as fair. In the design of that accounting system, the
need for an annual reconciliation is well recognized and is a well-docu-
mented requirement. Based on the information provided by personal interview
(Kopinsky, 1976), the annual November "wall-to-wall" count is often delayed
and sometimes cancelled entirely. Thus, there are times when reconcill ia-
tion only occurs eyery two years. Additionally, the quality of the annual
inventory could easily be suspect because it is routinely done by the same
persons in the field that maintain the perpetual inventory logs. This
violates a basic auditing precept that one cannot audit oneself. (Newman,
1958, p. 1).
3. Assessment of the Matson Container Equipment Control System
a. Simplicity
The Matson system is considered to be excellent relative to
simplicity. The system has been designed to provide the outputs presently
needed by management. The system is so mechanized as to allow growth if
additional algolrythms or new output formats are later desired. Persons
needing particular information from the system can access the system from
any of Matson's terminals with only a minimal amount of training. Inputs
to the system are equally simple.
Although the Matson CECS is designed to function as a tracking
system for containers, it is compatible with a more complex system which
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records and processes the invoices, bills, etc. for. the contents of the
containers. While these two distinctly different systems share parts of
the same computer and some of the basic input information, each operates
(from the output point of view) as if there were no common link.
b. Accessibility
The Matson inventory tracking system rates an excellent acces-
sibility grade. Inputs can be made from any of many terminals. Outputs are
available in virtual real time. Corrections can be made as errors are dis-
covered using any of the terminals. Management data can be called out in
formats that meet virtually any need.
c. Timeliness
If the timeliness of the Matson container tracking system were
evaluated only on the containers held in the west coast yards, the system
would clearly be rated as excellent. However, if the containers that are
in place in Hawaii are considered, the system should then rate somewhat
lower. There is an accepted time lag on input data for containers in place
in the islands. Therefore, with respect to timeliness, the Matson system
actually should be rated as good.
d. Accuracy
Based on the authors' perception of how the system is mechanized,
the accuracy of the Matson system is at least good. This perception was
reinforced when in an interview, the Matson representative stated that their
errors are less than a fraction of a percent. (Burkart, 1976). The authors'
concern is with the potential loss of containers that are shipped to the
islands and then go unreported for long periods.
e. Confidence
From the aspect of confidence, the Matson CECS should be rated
as excellent. Both upper management and lower working levels use the system
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with a great deal of confidence. The ease in which, data can be gathered,
tested, verified, and corrected on the spot tends to enhance the reliability
of the system. For example, when a system can be accessed via remote termi-
nal and the results verified by an actual yard count, it does not take long
to develop an appreciation for the system's reliability. (Dawdy, 1976).
f. Cost Effectiveness
When questioned about the costs of the Matson CECS, the follow-
ing written response was received from Matson personnel:
Line costs vary with the distance involved. Personnel costs may be
offset by personnel savings realized when manual systems were dropped .*
Computer costs are hard to measure because only one partition of the
computer is being used, and the computer would be needed by Matson in
any case. (Matson, 1976).
While the previous statement does not provide a proof of the
system's cost effectiveness, it can be demonstrated in another way. Matson
developed the CECS to provide ease of tracking for their own containers
numbering about 15,000. Foreign shipping firms have contracted with Matson
to provide a similar service on their containers rather than do it them-
selves. Their willingness to pay the basic cost plus Matson's profit for
this service is considered by the authors as an adequate proof of the
system's cost effectiveness. Therefore, with respect to cost effectiveness,
the Matson CECS is rated as excellent.
g. Input Confirmation
Matson's CECS lends itself to rapid confirmation of input data.
Feedback is essentially immediate and verifies that the intended information
was received correctly. For example, when the gatekeeper in Oakland records
the receipt of container serial number 12345 but makes an error and inputs
13245 (unless both serial numbers were previously entered into the system
as being in the Oakland area), an input error will be displayed. In response
Underlining included by the authors.
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to the error signal, the gatekeeper must verify that he has indeed input
the proper serial number of the container at the gate. If he has, he
simply "overrides" the system. If not, he corrects his error. What happens
when the two containers are located such that the computer would not respond
with an error signal will be discussed under reconciliation. Because the
response is so fast and so clear to those entering data or questioning the
system, the system should be rated as excellent relative to confirmation,
h. Reconciliation
Matson 1 s CECS deserves an excellent rating with respect to
reconciliation. As discussed in the previous section on confirmation,
the act of correcting errors as they are detected is but one aspect of
reconciliation. The need for frequent reconciliation has been well re-
cognized and accommodated by Matson. In addition to the annual inventory
for tax-reporting purposes, Matson performs a less detailed inventory for
each yard on a quarterly basis. A daily inventory and reconciliation of
items received in or moved about the yard on any given day is also performed
Thus, in the example discussed under confirmation, the error made upon
receipt, but not immediately caught by the gatekeeper, would be detected
and corrected in the daily verification of items received and stored in the
yard.
B. COMPARISONS
As is shown in Figure 3, the Matson CECS clearly rates superior to the
Air Force and Navy systems in all attributes. In fact, the Matson CECS
most nearly approaches what might be termed an optimum inventory accounting
system. The Matson system thoroughly answers the questions of quantity,
location, condition, and identity of its inventory components. In the





NAVY AIR FORCE MATSON
" SIMPLICITY 2 3 4
ACCESSIBILITY 1 2 4
TIMELINESS 1 2 3
ACCURACY 1 1 3





CONFIRMATION 1 1 4
RECONCILIATION 1 2 4
FIGURE 2. SYSTEM ASSESSMENT SUMMARY







temporary loss of track of containers offloaded in the Hawaiian Islands.
However, the Matson representatives indicated that even that facet was
being considered for remedial action by the plan to install direct access
terminals in the island yards and offices. (Burkart, 1976).
The Air Force Ammunition Management System, while not rated as high as
that of Matson, had only three attributes that were rated as poor. These
three (accuracy, confidence and input confirmation) are related in the
following way.
When feedback (input confirmation) is slow or nonexistent, the accuracy
of the system will surely suffer because input errors will go undetected.
At the same time, there is no way to establish any degree of confidence in
a known inaccurate system. However, it is understood that the Air Force
is now in the process of reassessing the present system and intends to
implement some major corrective changes. (Walker, March 17, 1976).
The following changes are presently being contemplated to improve the
Air Force Ammunition Management System:
— Increase base/depot maintenance asset visibility on items (1) due
in for overhaul, (2) condemned, (3) due in for maintenance, (4) due
out of maintenance, and (5) in "floating stock."
--Record ownership account codes.
—Perform monthly reconciliation of assets by base (internally
computed).
--Improve analysis of war reserve material, etc. to include actual
levels on hand versus authorized quantities.
--Record and monitor inter/intra area asset transfers.
—Record and monitor inter/intra area asset receipts.
— Perform asset inventory adjustments.
—Calculate total recorded assets by command
—Calculate total recorded assets by area.
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While the Air Force system may not be as optimum as that of Matson, it
must be remembered that it encompasses a much larger geographical area and
involves a larger component mix than does the Matson system. The authors
feel that the Air Force system needs particular emphasis placed on the
track of high-cost items.
As can be seen rather dramatically in Figure 3, the Navy system rates
below the Air Force system and far below the Matson system. Except for the
aspect of simplicity, the system is considered unsatisfactory in all its
attribute ratings. Because of the quality of the data and the lack of con-
fidence that can be placed in that data, the manager's control of his pro-
gram is weakened considerably. The manager is placed in an awkward position.
If he accepts the quantities shown as accurate while they are low, he will
underbuy and fall short of meeting Fleet requirements. If, on the other
hand, the true count is really higher than indicated, the manager will
t
overbuy and tie up funds unnecessarily in excess assets. If the manager
recognizes the inaccuracy possibility, he is placed in the position of
having to guess what to do and generally will recommend overbuying to
assure that the Fleet requirements are met. Thus, excess funds will normally
be tied up in inventory.
None of these options are considered reasonable in light of the cost
per unit of many of the assets being procured and supplied.
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the analysis of the Navy, Air Force, and Matson inventory
accounting systems and their assessment relative to the eight attributes,
it is obvious that the Matson system is superior to both military systems.
While it is recognized that the military systems must serve a more broad
asset distribution scenario, this is not considered to be the primary
reason for the disparity in the system.
It is felt that the Matson system is superior to the Navy and Air Force
systems for three primary reasons--(l) direct access terminals, (2) inven-
tory accounting which is independent of other systems, and (3) serialized
tracking.
A. DIRECT ACCESS TERMINALS
Direct access terminals provides the Matson system many advantages over
the more manual systems used by the Navy and Air Force. First, persons
entering data into the system have the advantage of immediate feedback.
Input errors are easily detected and corrected with the direct access equip-
ment. As an action occurs, it is almost immediately reflected in the sys-
tem. Management can gain an extremely accurate picture of their inventory
status in virtual real time. Because of the strategic placement of the
direct access terminals, no critical action is taken on a Matson container
without the action being recorded in the system. Because of the extensive
care taken by Matson to place these terminals in strategic locations, their
use has become second nature to the operating and management personnel. No
other supplementary systems have been considered necessary.
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B. INDEPENDENCE OF ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
The Matson CECS is designed to perform a valuable inventory tracking
function. Although it is compatible with other systems used by Matson,
e.g., invoice and billing systems, it is still independent. Matson personnel
have been careful not to lose sight of the intended purpose of the system.
It has been designed around the needs of the user. Output reports are con-
cise and answer the questions asked. While the system may share inputs
with, and provide inputs to, the other systems, it does not rely on other
systems for its performance. Modification to the software for the other
systems has no effect on the CECS.
C. SERIALIZED TRACKING
Serialized tracking of the Matson CECS provides tremendous visibility
relative to where particular containers are located. It also provides a
means of reference when one particular container needs to be found.
Besides these obvious advantages, there are some less obvious advantages
which may in the long run be even more important. Serialized tracking pro-
vides a means of performing a much simpler audit of assets. It provides a
means by which input errors can be easily detected and corrected. It pro-
vides a virtually automatic means of error reconcill iation, which in turn
improves the system accuracy and results in increased confidence in the
system's output data. Tracking by serial number can also provide other by-
product data such as: (1) identification of containers needing repair,
(2) identification of containers by consignee and loaded weight, and (3)
identification of special cargo.
While the preceeding statements may provide adequate reasons for Matson '
s
serialized tracking of containers, one might ask how this can be extended
to apply to assets controlled by the Navy and Air Force.
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Before answering this question, it is suggested- that the aspect of the
items' monetary value first be considered. Because of the quantity handled
and the per-unit cost of these items, it is obvious that there is no need
to determine which 30 caliber bullet or which MK82 bomb is being held,
shipped, fired or dropped. For this reason, it would be far from cost
effective, and probably meaningless, to track items of these types by ser-
ial number.
It is submitted then that items which have a high-dollar value and/or
require routine maintenance should be tracked by serial number. This would
apply to such items as missiles, launchers, aircraft guns, racks and high-
value specialized ground-support equipment. For purposes of simplicity,
examples will be expressed in terms of missile assets, but the same comments
would hold true for any of the serialized components mentioned.
Probably the most important reason for recording by serial number, from
an accounting viewpoint, is the self-correcting feature which was discussed
in the assessment of the Matson CECS. When a serial-numbered unit is dis-
covered in a location where it is not expected, the system feeds back a
rejection message. If, after recheck, the input data are determined to be
correct, the override action is taken and the system error is corrected.
Thus, at least with respect to that particular item, the stored data are
corrected. This type of action can only occur if on-line input terminals
are positioned at strategic locations. In the case of Navy assets, the
locations would include weapon stations, depots, and other intermediate
shipping or handling points as necessary.
Serialized tracking provides an excellent means for maintaining a
simple audit trail and deletes the need for extensive back tracking in




When errors have been made during a series of years, and when the
books are to be corrected at the close of the series, it is usually
better to correct such errors as exist at that time, and to ignore
errors which have been automatically corrected by counterbalancing
errors. (Finney, 1949, p. 129).
Another important consideration is that in knowing the exact location
of particular serial-numbered units, a manager has the capability of easily
calling back, providing field repair and restricting from use units which
are known or suspected to be defective. For example, if a particular group
of new or reworked missiles were known to contain a component with a latent
defect, they could be easily recalled. All the manager would have to do
would be to determine where the particular serial numbers had been positioned
and issue recall requests to the holding activities. At present, the only
means to recall assets in the above category is to provide a listing of the
defective unit serial numbers to every activity that might possibly hold
them. Every activity then needs to take a physical asset count to see if
they hold those particular assets. The likelihood of locating the assets
in a reasonable time or even locating all of the items is extremely slight.
It was reported that at one time it took in excess of three years to locate
and recall 200 new SPARROW missiles which had been manufactured with a
defective potientiometer. (Hannan, 1976).
As a final argument in favor of serialized tracking, a major logistic
concern for missile assets is that of bringing assets back from the Fleet
when they are due for mandatory maintenance. Three things are important
in this regard. First, it is important for the manager to have a clear
picture of the number of assets that will be coming back for maintenance
so that he can arrange (fund) for the maintenance actions. One cannot
assume that components sent out today will automatically be returned on
their mandatory maintenance due date. There are other factors that deter-
mine when components are returned, such as deployed schedule changes and
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failed units. Second, it is important for the using command to have a
realistic picture of the status of the inventory their ships hold. Serial-
ized tracking, coupled with maintenance due-date information could easily
provide that picture. Third, the weapon stations and the depot repair
facilities must be informed of the number of assets to expect so that
provisions can be made for handling, testing and repair.
The disadvantage of serialized tracking would be that serial numbers
would have to be listed on shipping documents, as well as listing quantities
and types. This provides only little difficulty because, at present, mis-
sile component serial number information is available at the point of ship-
ment, but not recorded because it is not a stated requirement. (DalPino,
1976). Recognizing that including serial numbers for missile component
shipments is not especially difficult to implement, the reason for recording
them deserves consideration.
D. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS (NAVY SYSTEM)
It is recognized that the Air Force is presently in the process of
improving their ammunition management system. Therefore, because the basic
performance of the Air Force system, while not optimum, rated well above
that of the Navy, recommendations for corrective action will be directed
only to improvement of the Navy system. It is recommended that:
—A physical count of high-value assets be made mandatory, at
least annually.
— Results of the annual physical count be used to update the
perpetual inventory and reasons for major variances stated
explicitly.
—Annual physical counts be performed by agencies other than
the ones maintaining the asset logs.
—A distinct separation be made between the accounting of high-




--The feasibility of using a NAVAIR field activity as the
central repository for high-value/major repairable assets
be investigated.
—The coupling of serial number tracking with maintenance due
dates be instigated.
--The condition coding of air-launched assets be reduced to
only three categories—acceptable for issue, unserviceable,
and unknown, i.e., A, F, and X.
--Direct access remote terminals with cathode ray tube displays
be installed at strategic locations, e.g., at all primary and
secondary stock points to allow for real time input and output.
--The Navy establish a full-time inventory manager at each
strategic location and make that manager responsible for
inventory accounting records and transactions at that activity.
--The inventory accounting system for ALMs be made a separate
and distinct system, i.e., separate it from CAIMS as we now
know it.
Appendix G offers items to be considered in implementing the recommen-
dations made above.
E. FURTHER RECOMMENDATION (INSTRUMENT VERIFICATION)
This thesis developed an instrument by which inventory accounting systems
could be evaluated and that instrument was given its initial test in the
authors' assessment of the two military and one commercial inventory account-
ing systems. It is recommended that the assessment instrument be further
evaluated both by reassessment of the three systems included in this thesis
and by test of other comparable inventory accounting systems.
55

INDEX TO THE APPENDIX
APPENDIX A - Glossary of Acronyms 57
APPENDIX B - ALM Functional Flow 59
APPENDIX C - United States Air Force Ammunition Management System. . 62
APPENDIX D - Matson Container Equipment Control System 64
APPENDIX E - Explanation of Attribute Ratings 70
APPENDIX F - United States Air Force Ammunition Management System
Input Forms 72
APPENDIX G - Suggested Steps for Developing a Naval Ammunition
Accounting System for High-Value Assets Which Require





AD&C Ammunition Distribution and Control Division
AFLC Air Force Logistics Command
AGM Air- to-Ground Missile
AIM Air Intercept Missile
ALC Air Logistics Center
ALM Air-Launched Missile
AUR Ail-Up Round
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
BOM Bill of Materials
CAIMS Conventional Ammunition Integrated Management System
CECS Container Equipment Control System
CENO Central NOMIS Office
CINCLANTFLT. . . . Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet
CINCPACFLT .... Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
DODIC Department of Defense Identification Code
FMSAEG Fleet Missile Systems Analysis and Evaluation Group
GCG Guidance and Control Sections or Group
IM Inventory Manager
IMA Intermediate Maintenance Activity
INAS Industrial Naval Air Station
MASO Munition Accountable Supply Officer
MDCS Maintenance Data Collection System
MILSTRAP Military Standard Reporting and Accounting Procedures
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MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisitioning- and Issue Procedures
MMMU-1 Mobile Missile Maintenance Unit One
NAS Naval Air Station
NAVAIREWORKFAC
. . Naval Air Rework Facility
NAVAIRSYSCOM . . . Naval Air Systems Command
NAVSEASYSCOM . . . Naval Sea Systems Command
NMEF Naval Mine Engineering Facility
NOMIS Naval Ordnance Management Information System
NSN National Stock Number
PP&C Production Planning and Control Division
SISR Selected Item Status Report
SNUD Stock Number User Directory
SRAN Stock Record Account Number
SLIT Serial Lot Item Tracking
SPCC Navy Ships Parts Control Center
TIR Transaction Item Reporting
TYCOM Type Commander
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U.S. AIR FORCE AMMUNITION
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM INPUT FORMS
COMMENTS CARD
Field Card Cols Special Instructions
Stock record account number 1-5
DODIC 6-9






Consecutive number (1-9) of group
must be "R."
Transaction code 78-79 \
END OF MONTH NOTIFICATION CARD
Description Card Col Special Instructions
Document identifier 1-3 Always 1EM
Reserved- 4-8
Reporting- command code 9 Para 2c, atch K-7
Reserved 10-68




PREPOS1TIONED MATERIEL RECEIPT CARD ENTRIES
(OTHER THAN PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT SOURCE)
Field Legend
Card
Cols Explanation and Instructions
Document Identifier 1-3 Enter "DWG."
Routing Identifier (TO) 4-6 Enter the code identifying the inventory control
point to which the receipt will be reported ("FGS"
or "FLZ").
Status 7 Leave blank.
Stock Number 8-22 Enter stock number of the item to be received.
Unit of Issue 23-24 Enter unit of issue of the item.
Quantity 25-29 Enter quantity to be received preceding signifi-
cant digits with zeros.
Document Number 30-43 Enter the controlling MILSTRIP-type document
number.
Suffix 44 Enter the controlling MILSTRIP suffix code;
otherwise, leave blank.
Supplementary Address 45-50 Enter MILSTRIP supplementary address; other-
wise, leave blank.
Signal 51 Enter signal code; otherwise, leave blank.
Fund 52-53 Enter fund code; otherwise, leave blank.
Distribution 54-56 Enter MILSTRIP distribution code; otherwise,
leave blank.
Project 57-59 Enter MILSTRIP project code; otherwise, leave
blank.
Multi-Use 60-66 Leave blank.











SUGGESTED STEPS FOR DEVELOPING A NAVAL AMMUNITION
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM FOR HIGH-VALUE ASSETS WHICH
REQUIRE PERIODIC AND UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
The following steps are suggested for developing a new, high-value
ammunition accounting system, and are made using the assumptions that:
--The system will be independent of other systems.
--The system will have direct access capability
--The system will provide serialized tracking.
A. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
It is essential that the responsibility for the system's design be
assigned to one activity. It is suggested that the assignment be made
to a Naval Air Systems command field activity with a strong background
in management/data systems development.
B. TEAM DEVELOPMENT
Once the task of developing a new system has been assigned to a par-
ticular activity, the next step is to structure a working team to develop
and implement the new system. The makeup of the team is critical. It
would be expected that the team membership would change during the various
phases of system implementation, and that the amount of involvement by
individuals might vary depending upon what phase is in process. It would
be expected that the activity whose responsibility it is to lead the effort
would choose team members representing the views of:
—A program manager --A type commander
--An inventory manager --A field weapons manager
--A weapon station logistician --A supply system manager
—A rework activity --A data processor
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C. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND SYSTEM SPECIFICATION PREPARATION
One of the first tasks that would be expected of the team would be to
determine the system requirements. In order to establish the system
requirements, it would be expected that a detailed survey of the user's
needs would be conducted. Results of the survey would be analyzed and
the information used to write the system specifications. The system spec-
ification crystallizes and records the new system's complete structure,
and becomes the central reference point for joint action by all involved
in the project.
D. DETERMINATION OF STRATEGIC INPUT SOURCES
Once the specifications are written, the team must focus on strategic
points where direct-access equipment is to be located. The choice of the
locations must take into consideration such aspects as:
--Availability of communication lines (telephone)
--Need for secure lines
--Proximity to where the action to be reported takes place
--Requirements for reporting to other systems
E. DETERMINATION OF EQUIPMENT NEEDS
In this respect, two distinct areas of concern arise. First
,
the
number of locations where inputs are to be made and outputs displayed
must be established. It is anticipated that all remote terminals would
have both input and display capability, but not all points where informa-
tion is needed will be required to make inputs. Second , the type of equip-
ment must be selected. This should be a direct function of:
--Type inputs anticipated
--Quantity of inputs/outputs anticipated
--Type outputs needed, i.e., visual CRT display or printed copy
It would be expected that the team would examine the data processing
equipment presently in the Navy's inventory for possible use. In this
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respect, it would be expected that assumption of "system independence"
would be honored. This is not intended to require a separate computer,
but rather to assure that the high-value asset accountability function is
not commingled with other remotely related supply functions.
F. DEVELOPMENT OF A MECHANIZATION PROGRAM PLAN
After the preliminary fact-finding efforts are out of the way, the
physical development of a new system can begin. Based on the user's needs,
a program master plan should be prepared. The plan should include:
--Objectives






--Training plans and schedules
--General descriptions of the output products
G. SYSTEM MECHANIZATION
The system would be mechanized in accordance with the previously
mentioned program master plan. Mechanization, of course, would include
procurement, installation, test and evaluation. It would include the
design and proof testing of the software as well as the procurement,
installation and test of the hardware.
H. INPUT DATA GATHERING
The initial data needed to prime the system can come from only one
source. That source is not the CAIMS. The source of new inventory data
initially must come from a special one-time physical count because:
The function of the physical counts under a perpetual inventory system
is to check the accuracy of a record already in existence, not to sup-
ply for the first time information not to be found anywhere in the
records. (Moonitz, Strehling, 1952).
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Regardless of the inherent inaccuracy of the CAIMS data, the need for
the initial physical count is actually justified by the mandatory require-
ment to record assets by serial number. That data cannot be obtained from
CAIMS.
I. SYSTEM TEST
After adequate training has been provided, a period of trial should be
used to establish confidence in the system. Periodic surveillance of the
system's accuracy can easily be accomplished if the team (which would be
required to establish basic system operation and maintenance policy) requires
at least annual physical counts for the total system, and occasional random
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